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You never want a serious crisis to go to waste. And what I mean by that is 
an opportunity to do things you think you could not do before. 
- Rahm Emanuel1 
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 1. Rahm Emanuel on the Opportunities of Crisis, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 19, 2008), 
http://live.wsj.com/video/rahm-emanuel-on-the-opportunities-of-crisis/3F6B9880-D1FD-
492B-9A3D-70DBE8EB9E97.html#!3F6B9880-D1FD-492B-9A3D-70DBE8EB9E97. 
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INTRODUCTION 
American legal education is in the grip of what some have called an 
“existential crisis.”2 The New York Times proclaims the death of the current 
system of legal education as a result of a severe shortage of full-time jobs 
for law school graduates3 combined with spiraling debt loads to finance 
increasing tuition.4 The trend toward emphasizing theory at the expense of 
more practical professional skills has also been identified as a major com-
ponent of the crisis.5 This is attributed, in part, to the incentivizing of faculty 
to produce increasingly abstract scholarship and the costs this imposes on 
pedagogy and the mentoring of students.6 A number of critics, inside and 
outside of legal academia, assert that students graduate from law school ill-
equipped to actually practice law.7 
  
 2. Lincoln Caplan, An Existential Crisis for Law Schools, N.Y. TIMES (July 14, 
2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/15/opinion/sunday/an-existential-crisis-for-law-
schools.html?_r=2&ref=todayspaper; see also BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, FAILING LAW SCHOOLS 
(2012); Paul F. Campos, Campos: The Law Student Debt Crisis, TAXPROF BLOG (May 16, 
2012), http://taxprof.typepad.com/taxprof_blog/2012/05/campos-the.html; Bill Henderson, 
Unsustainable Law Student Debt, LEGAL WHITEBOARD (Mar. 25, 2012), 
http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/legalwhiteboard/2012/03/unsustainable-law-student-
debt.html. 
 3. See Joe Palazzolo, Law Grads Face Brutal Job Market, WALL ST. J., June 25, 
2012, at A1, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142405270230445860457 
7486623469958142.html. 
 4. See, e.g., David Segal, What They Don’t Teach Law Students: Lawyering, N.Y. 
TIMES (Nov. 19, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/20/business/after-law-school-
associates-learn-to-be-lawyers.html?_r=1&pagewanted=all; Caplan, supra note 2; see also 
Brian Z. Tamanaha, How to Make Law School Affordable, N.Y. TIMES, June 1, 2012, at A27, 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/01/opinion/how-to-make-law-school-
affordable.html?ref=opinion (“T[he] economics of legal education are broken.”); Editorial, 
Legal Education Reform, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 26, 2011, at A18, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/26/opinion/legal-education-reform.html (“American legal 
education is in crisis. The economic downturn has left many recent law graduates saddled 
with crushing student loans and bleak job prospects. . . . [The case method approach] was 
dated by the 1920s. It was a relic by the 1960s. . . . In reforming themselves, law schools 
have the chance to help reinvigorate the legal profession.”); TAMANAHA, supra note 2;  Hen-
derson, supra note 2; Campos, supra note 2. 
 5. Segal, supra note 4. 
 6. See Patrick J. Schiltz, Legal Ethics in Decline: The Elite Law Firm, the Elite 
Law School, and the Moral Formation of the Novice Attorney, 82 MINN. L. REV. 705, 707-08 
(1998) (“[L]aw schools have the capacity to replace many of the traditional functions of 
professional mentoring . . . . However, . . . the academy is unlikely to assume those responsi-
bilities because of an increasing materialism of its own—a materialism measured mainly in 
academic prestige rather than personal income.”). 
 7. Many firms are adding business training because students are not receiving it in 
law school. See, e.g., Palazzolo, supra note 3; Segal, supra note 4; see also WILLIAM M. 
SULLIVAN ET AL., EDUCATING LAWYERS: PREPARATION FOR THE PROFESSION OF LAW (2007) 
(highlighting the subordinate place of practical legal skills). 
 Gender and the Crisis in Legal Education 1747 
At the same time, despite women graduating from law schools in sig-
nificant numbers since the 1980s,8 they continue to lag behind in the most 
prestigious positions in academia—tenured, full professorships: 
Statistics collected by the Association of American Law Schools (AALS) . . . 
demonstrate that while women have made continuous progress on law school fac-
ulties, they still occupy a disproportionate percentage of the lower-paying, lower-
status jobs. From academic year 1998−99 to academic year 2007−08, the percent-
age of women law school deans rose from 10.4% to 19.8%. Their proportion of full 
professors grew from 20% to 29.3% of the population. Unfortunately, however, 
women represent 61.3% of lecturers and 65.4% of instructors. In contrast, men rep-
resent the vast majority of high-paying and high-prestige positions, 80.2% of 
deans, 70.7% of full professors, but a minority of low-paying and low-prestige po-
sitions, 38.7% of lecturers and 34.6% of instructors.9 
I argue that these two phenomena—the incentivizing of scholarship at 
the expense of pedagogy and the slow progress of women to tenured, full 
professorships—are linked. The former has imposed significant costs on 
legal education as a whole.10 It has distorted the allocation of institutional 
resources at American law schools and has skewed scarce resources, includ-
ing faculty time, law student tuition, and private donor contributions. In 
addition to these general costs, the trend also imposes a disproportionate 
cost on women faculty who carry a much greater share of the caregiving and 
household responsibilities in their families.11 These women are also bur-
  
 8. WOMEN’S BAR ASS’N OF D.C., CREATING PATHWAYS TO SUCCESS: ADVANCING 
AND RETAINING WOMEN IN TODAY’S LAW FIRMS 25 (2006) (“[W]omen have been graduating 
from law schools at levels of 40% or higher since 1985.”). 
 9. For the most comprehensive article explaining the impact of the subtle norms in 
legal academia on women faculty, see Ann C. McGinley, Reproducing Gender on Law 
School Faculties, 2009 BYU L. REV. 99, 102-03 (footnotes omitted) (citing, among other 
sources, ASS’N OF AM. LAW SCH., STATISTICAL REPORT ON LAW FACULTY: 2007–2008, at 18 
(2008), available at http://www.aals.org/statistics/report-07-08.pdf; Statistical Report on 
Law School Faculty and Candidates for Law Faculty Positions: 2005–2006, ASS’N AM. L. 
SCH., http://www.aals.org/statistics/0506/0506_T2A_tit4_8yr.html (last visited Feb. 20, 
2013)). 
 10. Segal, supra note 4. 
 11. See, e.g., Danielle Kurtzleben, Vive La Difference? Gender Divides Remain in 
Housework, Child Care, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (June 22, 2012), 
http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2012/06/22/vive-la-difference-gender-divides-remain-
in-housework-child-care (“Last year, women did far more housework and child-rearing than 
their male counterparts, while men stayed at the office longer than women, according to the 
Labor Department’s 2011 American Time Use Survey.”); Joan C. Williams & Donna L. 
Norton, Building Academic Excellence Through Gender Equity, 4 AM. ACAD. 185, 200 
(2008) (“Despite the gains of the women’s movement, the fact of the matter is that women 
still shoulder the lion’s share of caregiving responsibilities.”); Robert Drago, Research Dir., 
Inst. for Women’s Policy Research, Bias Against Caregiving and Faculty Advancement, 
Presentation at the ACE/Alfred P. Sloan Invitational Conference for Medical School Deans 
(Sept. 23, 2010), available at http://www.acenet.edu/leadership/programs/Documents/3-
Drago.pdf (highlighting “leaks in the academic pipeline for women”). 
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dened by a disproportionate share of the student caregiving and institutional 
“housework” on committees inside law schools.12 
In this paper, I argue that the external pressure on law schools created 
by the crisis actually presents an opportunity for women faculty. Part I de-
scribes the origins of the modern university and the unified model of teach-
ing and scholarship. Part II evaluates the costs of this model to legal educa-
tion as highlighted by the critics in the current crisis. Part III explores the 
heightened cost to women law faculty of this model adopted from the 
broader university. And Part IV offers suggestions for fundamentally re-
structuring the legal academy to provide a level playing field for women 
faculty and facilitate their movement in equal numbers into tenured, full 
professorships. 
I. THE ORIGINS OF THE MODERN UNIVERSITY AND THE UNIFIED MODEL OF 
TEACHING AND SCHOLARSHIP 
Law schools are parts of a larger academic whole—the university. The 
university is a place where teachers and students gather to create, share, and 
transmit knowledge. Universities were constructed around gendered norms 
where men taught other men, few of whom were primary caregivers for 
others. Not surprisingly, the slow progress of women in legal academia mir-
rors that of women in American universities generally. The American Asso-
ciation of University Women (AAUW) has concluded that “women have 
made remarkable strides in academia” in the last twenty years, but that 
“[d]espite these gains, women remain underrepresented at the highest eche-
lons of higher education. . . . On average, compared to men, women earn 
less, hold lower-ranking positions, and are less likely to have tenure.”13 
Both American universities and American law schools embrace a uni-
fied model of teaching and research (hereinafter the “unified model”), 
where faculty perform the dual functions of teacher and scholar concurrent-
ly during a career, in addition to engaging in faculty governance.14 The uni-
fied model valorizes the integration of teaching and research functions on 
the part of the professoriate. While this unified model has benefits, it im-
  
 12. Nancy Levit, Keeping Feminism in Its Place: Sex Segregation and the Domesti-
cation of Female Academics, 49 U. KAN. L. REV. 775, 786-87 (2001); see also McGinley, 
supra note 9, at 150-52 (citing studies that demonstrate this disparity in academia more gen-
erally). 
 13. AAUW EDUC. FOUND. & AAUW LEGAL ADVOCACY FUND, TENURE DENIED: 
CASES OF SEX DISCRIMINATION IN ACADEMIA 1 (2004), available at 
http://www.aauw.org/learn/research/upload/Tenuredenied.pdf. 
 14. “Faculty governance entitles faculty members to significant or even decisive 
input in virtually every decision made at the law school” or “letting the inmates run the asy-
lum.” Susan J. Becker, Thanks, But I’m Just Looking: Or, Why I Don’t Want to Be a Dean, 
49 J. LEGAL EDUC. 595, 598 (1999). 
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poses costs as well.15 It also imposes particularly disparate costs on women. 
So too does the tenure system, which facially measures teaching, scholar-
ship, and service but de facto really only values scholarship unless the can-
didate’s teaching is “‘so bad as to provoke student rioting.’”16 
This embrace of the unified model mirrors other parts of the universi-
ty. Note, however, that law schools are significantly different from many 
other schools within the university in that law professors are generally paid 
much higher annual salaries than their counterparts in political science, so-
ciology, public health, and other departments.17 Law schools are more simi-
lar to medical schools in terms of faculty salaries. But unlike medical school 
faculty, law professors do not generate millions of dollars in research grants 
from government or the private sector. This situation has drawn the atten-
tion of a number of legal scholars and public commentators in the wake of 
the job crisis of the past four years and the spiraling debt loads of American 
law students. Scholars have observed that student tuition dollars cross-
subsidize faculty scholarship. And one scholar quantified the cost of some 
law review articles at nearly $100,000.18 This observation triggered a flurry 
of responses, both pro and con legal scholarship and pro-doctrinal scholar-
ship versus non-doctrinal, interdisciplinary scholarship.19 Thus, the recent 
crisis in legal education has seen the advent of a number of critics who have 
pointed out the significant costs of law schools adopting university norms 
while other scholars have mounted a vigorous defense of the status quo.20 
  
 15. See generally Marin Roger Scordato, The Dualist Model of Legal Teaching and 
Scholarship, 40 AM. U. L. REV. 367 (1990). 
 16. Paula A. Monopoli, Teaching Lawyers to Be More than Zealous Advocates, 
2001 WIS. L. REV. 1159, 1168 (reviewing DEBORAH RHODE, IN THE INTERESTS OF JUSTICE: 
REFORMING THE LEGAL PROFESSION (2000)) (quoting Schiltz, supra note 6, at 750). 
 17. See, e.g., Average Faculty Salaries by Field and Rank at 4-Year Colleges and 
Universities, 2011–12, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., http://chronicle.com/article/Sortable-Table-
Average/131081 (last visited Feb. 20, 2013) (noting that “[p]rofessors in law [averaging the 
highest salary at $135,187], engineering, and business earned the most, while instructors of 
English, history, and ethnic and gender studies made the least”). 
 18. See, e.g., Would You Pay $100,000 for a Law Review Article?, INSIDE L. SCH. 
SCAM (Aug. 12, 2011), http://insidethelawschoolscam.blogspot.com/2011/08/would-you-
pay-100000-for-law-review.html (citing estimate by Richard Neumann of the Hofstra Uni-
versity School of Law). 
 19. See, e.g., Walter Olson, Cost of a Law Review Article: $100,000; Student Debt 
to Pay for It: Priceless, OVERLAWYERED (May 8, 2011), 
http://overlawyered.com/2011/05/cost-of-a-law-review-article-100000-student-debt-to-pay-
for-it-priceless; Karen Sloan, Legal Scholarship Carries a High Price Tag, NAT’L L.J. (Apr. 
20, 2011), http://www.law.com/jsp/nlj/PubArticleNLJ.jsp?id=1202490888822&slreturn=1. 
 20. See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, You Get What You Pay for in Legal Education, 
NAT’L L.J. (July 23, 2012), http://www.law.com/jsp/nlj/PubArticleNLJ.jsp?id=1202 
564055135&You_get_what_you_pay_for_in_legal_education&slreturn=20120623185606; 
Karen Sloan, Book Gives Law Schools Failing Grade, NAT’L L.J. (June 18, 2012), 
http://www.law.com/jsp/nlj/PubArticlePrinterFriendlyNLJ.jsp?id=1202559659082&slreturn
=20120626190945 (quoting John O’Brien, Dean of the New England School of Law and 
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In order to understand the resistance to women ascending to positions 
of authority in modern academia, one must look briefly to the origins of the 
modern university and the embrace of the German model of the university 
associated with Wilhelm von Humboldt. One must also look to how modern 
American law schools came to have a home within universities and how 
they came to adopt the same tenure criteria as other departments, including 
the hard sciences and the social sciences.21 As noted above, the criteria for 
tenure at most American universities and law schools include a tri-partite 
model of teaching, scholarship, and service. Despite the rhetoric that each is 
equally important, most institutions rely almost exclusively on a tenure can-
didate’s scholarship. The following Section traces the origins of the unified 
model in the context of the evolution of the modern university. It also re-
views the history of how American law schools became part of the modern 
university. Situating the current status quo in this historical context is help-
ful since, often, “certain contemporary conditions can be more easily under-
stood in the light of the intellectual history of earlier times.”22 
A. The Origins of the Modern University 
Universities first arose in Europe during the later Middle Ages (c. 1150–
1500). The universitas was a corporation or guild of masters (professors) and 
scholars (students). Western civilization was developing rapidly at the time. The 
birth of this new and uniquely Western institution resulted from a combination of 
powerful societal trends. Briefly, these trends were the revival of mercantilism, 
growth of cities and the urban middle class, and bureaucratization, along with the 
12th-century intellectual renaissance. As European society became more complex, 
the universal Roman church, secular governments, and municipalities required ed-
ucated priests, administrators, lawyers, physicians, and clerks for business. Ful-
filling this social demand were the universities, which were clearly oriented toward 
teaching and the learned professions.23 
The golden age of learning in philosophy, rhetoric, and law developed 
by the Greeks and the Romans was followed by the Dark Ages in which 
“[t]he barbarian invasions destroyed the schools of the Roman Empire[,] . . . 
the darkest [period] in the intellectual history of Europe.”24 The resulting 
intellectual drought “gave rise to the monastic and Cathedral schools which 
  
Chairman of the ABA’s Council of the Section of Legal Education and Admissions to the 
Bar, that “‘the claim that a law degree is a bad investment doesn’t hold water’”). 
 21. See William D. Henderson, Commentary, The Inferiority Complex of Law 
Schools, NAT’L JURIST, Mar. 2012, at 4, 4-5. 
 22. Charles Homer Haskins, The Spread of Ideas in the Middle Ages, 1 SPECULUM 
19, 30 (1926). 
 23. John C. Scott, The Mission of the University: Medieval to Postmodern Trans-
formations, 77 J. HIGHER EDUC. 1, 6 (2006). 
 24. Marthellen R. van Scoyoc, Origin and Development of the University, 39 
PEABODY J. EDUC. 322, 323 (1962). 
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served the needs of the church.”25 During the Dark Ages, “‘Benedictine mo-
nasticism created almost the only homes of learning and education, and 
constituted by far the most powerful civilizing agency in Europe until it was 
superceded as an educational instrument by the growth of the universi-
ties.’”26 Thus, the original image of a “scholar” was derived from a singular-
ly male figure keeping knowledge alive as a scribe in an isolated monastery 
during the Dark Ages. 
During this period, monasteries had limited communication with town 
centers, and the Catholic Church facilitated much of that communication.27 
Thus, this communication had very little effect on the broader society.28 
This began to change as a result of the rise of the cathedral schools, which 
were created by the church to educate the clergy.29 Monasticsm and the ca-
thedral schools preceded the evolution of the university as an institution.30 
This evolution began in earnest in the twelfth century with a great influx of 
knowledge from the Arab and Byzantine worlds (including much of the 
ancient Greek philosophy as we know it).31 The first medieval universities 
were founded in the wake of this influx of heretofore unknown knowledge.32 
One of the most prominent medieval universities was the University of 
Paris.33 An institution that had begun as a cathedral school became a univer-
sity that served as a model for other universities.34 The University of Paris 
evolved from an institution managed by individual professors to one man-
aged by a “small oligarchy of officials.”35 In addition to this institutional 
shift, universities began to grant licenses (with approval from the state or 
church) to their graduates to credential them to teach elsewhere.36 As a re-
sult, these early universities trained the professoriate that went on to staff 
other educational institutions across Europe.37 
Oxford was one of the other major medieval universities.38 Unlike the 
University of Paris, Oxford’s early existence was more closely connected to 
political concerns than to religious ones.39 Thus, unlike other universities 
  
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. (quoting 1 HASTINGS RASHDALL, THE UNIVERSITIES OF EUROPE IN THE 
MIDDLE AGES 27 (1895)). 
 27. See Haskins, supra note 22, at 20-23. 
 28. See id. 
 29. See id. 
 30. See van Scoyoc, supra note 24, at 323. 
 31. Id. at 324. 
 32. See id. at 324-25. 
 33. See id. at 325-26, 328. 
 34. Id. at 326, 328. 
 35. Id. at 326. 
 36. See id. at 327-28. 
 37. See id. 
 38. See id. at 328-31. 
 39. See id. at 331. 
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that evolved from the cathedral schools, university officials at Oxford were 
linked more directly to the school itself, and it operated in a manner more 
akin to that of a modern-day school administration.40 
During the Renaissance, a number of societal changes triggered a sig-
nificant increase in the number of educated people. These changes included, 
among other things, the advent of the printing press, which facilitated the 
distribution of books.41 The Renaissance also saw the rise of Humanism, 
which focused less on the Bible as had the curriculum of the medieval peri-
od and more on philosophy, poetry, and history among other subjects.42 
As time went on, the mission of the university evolved: 
First to develop was the European medieval university, characterized by its teach-
ing mission and Scholasticism; the later Middle Ages society evolved rapidly, and 
higher education was required for administration in the church, secular states, and 
municipalities, as well as for the traditional “professions.” Thereafter, the early 
modern university of Europe and Latin America accepted nationalization (service 
to the government of the nation-state) and humanism; the early modern period saw 
the rise of independent nation-states. Next, the formative U.S. college of the 19th 
century advanced the democratization (service to the individual of the nation-state) 
of higher learning; America is the world’s first democratic nation-state and it ex-
tends Jeffersonian and Jacksonian liberalism to education. Simultaneously, the 
19th-century German (Humboldtian) university promoted the research mission and 
academic freedom; the state of Prussia consolidated its intellectual power by 
founding the University of Berlin in 1809−1810, following the Enlightenment and 
total defeat by Napoleon.43 
The model upon which many countries, including the United States, 
eventually based their universities was the German (Humboldtian) universi-
ty.44 Wilhelm von Humboldt was the Prussian education minister in the ear-
ly nineteenth century.45 His innovations in the university model at the Uni-
versity of Berlin during his brief period as minister have come to dominate 
our thinking about what a modern university should be: 
While setting up the new university, Humboldt established one basic doctrine: “to 
appoint the best intellects available, and to give them the freedom to carry on their 
research wherever it leads.” Three principles that flowed out of Humboldt’s doc-
trine became paramount at Berlin and later at most of the German-speaking univer-
sities. Ultimately, these principles also became famous around the globe. First, the 
principle of the unity of the research and teaching missions confirmed the im-
portance of original scholarship. Second, the principle of academic freedom devel-
oped. Consisting of Lernfreiheit (the concept of “freedom to learn”), which al-
lowed students to pursue any course of study, and Lehrfreiheit (the concept of 
  
 40. See id. at 328. 
 41. See Paul F. Grendler, Schooling in Western Europe, 43 RENAISSANCE Q. 775, 
780 (1990). 
 42. See id. at 781. 
 43. Scott, supra note 23, at 5-6. 
 44. See id. at 22-23. 
 45. Id. at 20. 
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“freedom to teach”), which allowed professors free inquiry regarding their lines of 
research and teaching, this principle was protected by the state. Third, the principle 
of the centrality of the arts and sciences, comprising “astronomy, biology, botany, 
chemistry, classics, geology, history, mathematics, philology, philosophy, physics, 
and political science,” raised the academic status of the traditional (humanistic) 
liberal arts faculty to the same level as the theology, law, and medicine faculties—
thereby elevating pure research.46 
In the United States, the Humboldtian model came to have some 
uniquely American features: “Throughout the 20th century, the modern 
American university elevated the mission of public service (service to the 
public of the nation-state); during ‘America’s century,’ the U.S. was the 
world’s leading democratic, economic, and military power.”47 
A number of scholars have noted that a primary legacy of the Hum-
boldtian model is this idea of the unity of teaching and research so that the 
university professor engages in both concurrently.48 “In summary, the Ger-
man university left many substantial legacies [including] regular integration 
of the teaching and research missions . . . .”49 And, while they note the bene-
fits of the unified model, many scholars have also noted the ongoing tension 
between the two activities: 
The current “knowledge society” presents complex research mission issues. 
Perennial problems are balancing the overall teaching and research missions, as 
well as basic versus applied research, which is linked to the public service mission. 
. . . Ultimately, research is a proven, dynamic mate to the teaching mission of the 
university, simultaneously meshing with the nationalization or public service mis-
sions. The research mission is valuable for the improvement of societies around the 
globe—creating a skilled workforce, enabling economic growth, improving health 
care, and encouraging knowledge production.50 
So how did training in the law, which has been viewed historically as 
a trade and now as more of a profession, come to be associated with the 
American university as an institutional matter? 
B. How American Law Schools Came to Be Housed in the University 
One of the most interesting scholars of the modern American law 
school is Bill Henderson, a professor of law at Indiana University Bloom-
ington. In a recent article, Henderson notes that in the eighteenth and nine-
teenth centuries, law was viewed as a trade in which one apprenticed with a 
practicing lawyer as the preferred method of training.51 It was not until the 
  
 46. Id. (citations omitted). 
 47. Id. at 6. 
 48. See id. at 23. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Henderson, supra note 21, at 4. 
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late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries that law schools began to ap-
pear as units of larger universities.52 This trend was met with great skepti-
cism by scholars of the time.53 Henderson notes that in 1918, economist 
Thorstein Veblen commented on this alarming development by noting that 
“‘the law school belongs in the modern university no more than a school of 
fencing or dancing.’”54 Indeed, he and other academics: 
[B]elieved that universities should be citadels for science-based learning and the 
production of knowledge. Law, in contrast, was a trade. Indeed, in the early 1900s, 
a substantial portion of the practicing bar had obtained their skill and knowledge 
through office apprenticeships. When law schools did begin to appear, they were 
just as likely to be proprietary law schools operating out of a local YMCA than to 
be part of an established university.55 
Why, then did universities embrace law schools and absorb them as 
sub-units? Henderson offers three practical reasons: (1) law was the primary 
occupation of many elected officials who saw this embrace as a way to ele-
vate their own status and credentials; (2) a small number of law schools at 
elite universities like Harvard had adopted the “case method,” developed by 
Christopher Columbus Langdell, which appeared similar to a scientific 
method of inquiry, with “objective legal rules” that could be parsed from 
judicial cases to form a body of knowledge that could be divined; and (3) 
law schools, with large lectures and without expensive laboratories, were 
profit centers for universities.56 
As an increasing number of American law schools became units of 
larger universities, the faculties of those law schools began to compare 
themselves to their colleagues in other departments. Thus, Henderson as-
serts they developed an “inferiority complex” in that their work was less 
scholarly than that of their counterparts.57 In order to assure themselves and 
the rest of the university that they were true scholars, they increasingly 
adopted the university’s unified model of teaching and scholarship built 
upon the Humboldtian approach. In addition, they adopted a tenure sys-
tem.58 That tri-partite tenure system in the larger university, while facially 
requiring excellence in teaching, scholarship, and faculty governance or 
service, actually focused dominantly on scholarship.59 And law schools fol-
lowed this tenure model in all respects in large part to justify their position 
  
 52. See id. 
 53. See id. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. 
 57. See id. at 4-5. 
 58. See id. at 4. 
 59. See id. 
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as a legitimate member of the academic community in which they found 
themselves.60 
The current trend in law faculty hiring reifies this movement. Most 
young law faculty now have fewer than one year of actual practice experi-
ence. They come from a handful of elite law schools where theory is em-
phasized over practice.61 But their credential is a J.D., not a Ph.D. The J.D. 
is not a research degree. There is no requirement that they study statistical 
methods of empirical inquiry. Nor do they have to conduct research and 
document that original research in a culminating thesis tested by oral exam-
inations. The J.D. is a professional degree that emphasizes doctrinal 
knowledge, problem solving, and advocacy methods. 
As students, many of today’s law faculty could have obtained a Ph.D. 
rather than a J.D., given their stellar undergraduate credentials. However, in 
the last forty years many of these talented students were warned by their 
mentors that there were few jobs in academia for Ph.D. recipients. They 
would have to be geographically very flexible and willing to accept low 
pay. These students opted to pursue a J.D. instead and then an academic 
career in law which required far fewer years of study and more lucrative 
salaries—in many cases doubling the starting salary of a Ph.D. in political 
science, sociology, or economics. They were rational actors who were max-
imizing their own welfare. One could hardly blame them, but they came to 
law school faculties ill-equipped to do rigorous empirical social science 
research of any quality. 
So some would argue that law schools have been captured in a sense 
by a generation of faculty who did not have the discipline to obtain a true 
research degree but who would like the status of those of their undergradu-
ate colleagues who did. And this inferiority complex that continues to 
plague the legal academy has significant costs to students and women facul-
ty alike. 
This Article is not an attempt to evaluate the validity of this movement 
in law schools. It suffices to say that the “parallels between science and law 
inevitably breakdown”62 when subject to close scrutiny, and indeed, the 
emperor appears to have no clothes. However, this is the status quo, so the 
next section evaluates the cost of the unified model and the tenure system’s 
disproportionate weighting of scholarship to both students and women fac-
ulty. 
  
 60. See id. 
 61. William D. Henderson & Rachel M. Zahorsky, The Pedigree Problem: Are Law 
School Ties Choking the Profession?, A.B.A. J., July 2012, at 36, 38. 
 62. Henderson, supra note 21, at 4. 
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II. THE COST TO LEGAL EDUCATION OF ADOPTING UNIVERSITY NORMS 
Even prior to the current crisis, a number of scholars have engaged in 
a critique of the unified model, as it has been adopted by the modern Amer-
ican law school.63 The current crisis has brought such critiques again to the 
fore. The fundamental premise is that the current model shortchanges peda-
gogy and mentoring of students in favor of the pursuit of increasingly ab-
stract scholarship.64 
The model encourages fewer and fewer years of practice for beginning 
law professors.65 It disadvantages women, given the de facto criteria of re-
quiring an article or two be published before hiring plus a federal court 
clerkship.66 Scholars like former law professor and now federal judge, Pat-
rick Schiltz, have characterized the increasing volume of scholarship re-
quired by law professors as academic “greed”—asserting it is the equivalent 
of the avarice represented by the increase in billable hours in law firms.67 
The commentary on the current crisis in legal education has linked the 
cost of legal scholarship and the enormous student debt incurred with few 
job prospects. It has challenged the notion that law faculty in a professional 
school (unlike a graduate school model) should be spending any time writ-
ing things other than treatises or doctrinal work. Articles which are essen-
tially political science, economics, and philosophy might arguably be pro-
duced much less expensively in those departments of the university where 
  
 63. See, e.g., Harry T. Edwards, The Growing Disjunction Between Legal Education 
and the Legal Profession, 91 MICH. L. REV. 34, 34 (1992) (“I fear that our law schools and 
law firms are moving in opposite directions. The schools should be training ethical practi-
tioners and producing scholarship that judges, legislators, and practitioners can use. . . . But 
many law schools . . . have abandoned their proper place, by emphasizing abstract theory at 
the expense of practical scholarship and pedagogy.”); Scordato, supra note 15. 
 64. Edwards, supra note 63. 
 65. Yale Law School will be offering a Ph.D. in Law as of Fall 2013. Sam Favate, 
Yale Law School to Offer Ph.D. in Law, WALL ST. J. L. BLOG (July 11, 2012, 11:23 AM), 
http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2012/07/11/yale-law-school-to-offer-ph-d-in-law. For critiques 
from law professors who graduated from Yale Law School, see David Lat, Calling Dr. Law: 
Yale Will Offer a Ph.D. in Law for Would-Be Legal Academics, ABOVE L. (July 12, 2012, 
4:22 PM), http://abovethelaw.com/2012/07/calling-dr-law-yale-will-offer-a-ph-d-in-law-for-
would-be-legal-academics/2. See also Brian Leiter, The Worst Idea in the History of Legal 
Education: A “PhD in Law”?, BRIAN LEITER’S L. SCH. REP. (July 11, 2012, 2:57 PM), 
http://leiterlawschool.typepad.com/leiter/2012/07/the-worst-idea-in-the-history-of-legal-
education-a-phd-in-law.html. 
 66. See Segal, supra note 4 (describing how publication of “esoteric” scholarship by 
aspiring law professor hires is “defended by law school professors as a way to attract the best 
and brightest to teaching”); see also Paula A. Monopoli, In a Different Voice: Lessons from 
Ledbetter, 34 J.C. & U.L. 555, 578 n.144 (2008) (citing a study that notes a 50% drop in 
women Supreme Court clerks in 2006). 
 67. Schiltz, supra note 6, at 706 (“For lawyers, it is greed for money; for law profes-
sors, it is greed for academic prestige.”). 
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the faculty are paid far less. Some undergraduate schools either have sepa-
rate legal studies departments, e.g., Amherst College, or offer degrees in 
legal studies within political science departments, e.g., the University of 
Massachusetts.68 In these departments, there are faculty members who have 
J.D.’s, Ph.D.’s, or both whose scholarship is interdisciplinary.69 However, 
most of these faculty members do not command an assumed market rate of 
salary as if they could go to the best law firms in the country and become 
highly paid associates or partners. 
The current crisis has put stress on the unified model of legal teaching 
and scholarship which presumes that it is more beneficial than costly for 
faculty to perform the two functions, in addition to faculty governance, as 
part of their job description.70 But some scholars have engaged in persuasive 
critiques of this model over the past two decades.71 When situated in the 
crisis in legal education that has recently come to pass, these scholars ap-
pear prescient. And some historians have noted the increasing tension be-
tween the two functions in the university as a whole and the distortions it 
creates in the teaching function: 
By 1900, the German university model and research mission had influenced, 
to varying degrees, higher education throughout the world. . . . In America, the 
emerging world power, institutions such as Johns Hopkins adopted both the re-
search ideal and graduate education . . . . The research mission dominated U.S. 
universities by 1910. With the triumph of the research ideal in America there began 
a decline of the teaching mission during the 20th century (much publicized in re-
cent decades).72 
III. THE DISPROPORTIONATE COST TO WOMEN FACULTY OF THE UNIFIED 
MODEL 
A. The Marginal Role of Women as Scholars in the University 
The university as an institution has consistently excluded women as 
students and professors. In the evolution of the medieval to the modern uni-
versity, women always had a marginal role. This was in part a result of the 
different curriculum that girls were allowed in primary education, a curricu-
  
 68. See Law, Jurisprudence, and Social Thought, AMHERST C., 
https://www.amherst.edu/academiclife/departments/ljst (last visited Feb. 20, 2013); Under-
grad-Legal Studies, UMASSAMHERST, http://polsci.umass.edu/legal (last visited Feb. 20, 
2013). 
 69. See Law, Jurisprudence, and Social Thought Faculty, AMHERST C., 
https://www.amherst.edu/academiclife/departments/ljst/faculty (last visited Feb. 20, 2013); 
Undergrad-Legal Studies, supra note 68. 
 70. See generally Scordato, supra note 15. 
 71. See id. 
 72. Scott, supra note 23, at 22-23 (citation omitted). 
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lum that did not prepare them to attend university.73 It was also a result of 
views on the proper sphere for women—the private rather than the public 
sphere.74 That view was significant in terms of encouraging the sex segrega-
tion of caregiving, and that segregation in turn creates a practical barrier to 
women’s full participation in the university even today. 
During the Renaissance, female education was limited in two signifi-
cant ways: (1) it focused exclusively on the study of grammar, neglecting 
any formal reasoning; and (2) women were taught in local languages, deny-
ing them the ability to learn Latin—the formal language of most universi-
ties.75 As a result, even if their families had allowed it, they were not pre-
pared to attend universities. 
For example, education was based around the teaching of the Trivium 
(language based subjects) and Quadrivium (number based subjects).76 The 
traditional Trivium was composed of grammar, logic, and rhetoric.77 Male 
students were exposed to all three of these areas with a particular focus on 
logic.78 For the most part, female students were taught only grammar.79 
Rhetoric and logic were seen as unnecessary to a woman’s primary duty of 
educating children, and might have a negative effect on the traditionally 
female virtues of chastity, silence, and obedience.80 As a result, women were 
not prepared to discuss the source material used in universities, e.g., Aristo-
tle or Cicero.81 
Not only was female education limited to grammar study, women 
were rarely allowed to study Latin since it was used in the public sphere, 
and the proper sphere for women was in the private sphere as caregivers.82 
Thus, it was deemed unnecessary to teach women Latin. Since university 
classes were taught entirely in Latin, women were not prepared to attend.83 
Thus, the different primary curriculum for girls and boys had a delete-
rious effect on the number of women who would be able to enroll in univer-
sities and this, in turn, translated into a dearth of women as university pro-
fessors.84 
  
 73. See Joan Gibson, Educating for Silence: Renaissance Women and the Language 
Arts, HYPATIA, Spring 1989, at 9, 10. 
 74. See id. at 12. 
 75. See id. at 10-12. 
 76. Id. at 10. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. at 11. 
 79. See id. 
 80. See id. at 12. 
 81. See id. at 10-12. 
 82. See id. at 12. 
 83. See id. at 10-12. 
 84. See id. 
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Renaissance pedagogical theorists believed that a woman should acquire learning 
appropriate to her expected adult role. This usually meant two things: first, most 
educated girls came from the middle and upper classes. Second, a girl normally ac-
quired vernacular reading and writing skills sufficient for her expected role as vir-
tuous and practical wife and mother, but no more. Since she could not attend uni-
versity or have a public role, she did not receive Latin schooling. . . . 
But there were exceptions. A few girls, often with strong paternal support, 
received Latin humanistic educations. Such girls did not have an easy time of it, 
because they had acquired skills inappropriate to their sex. A male with Latin hu-
manistic schooling could go on to the university and enjoy a public career where he 
could use his learning. A woman with a Latin education could only hope to be rec-
ognized through a literary exchange with male humanists.85 
The private sphere of caretaking in the home was still the proper place 
for women, not the public space of the university. So, as we can see, the role 
of “scholar” is itself highly gendered and in the context of the ancient ori-
gins of the workplace we inhabit—the university—it is associated with the 
masculine. 
B. Women and Caregiving in the Modern University 
Even when women began to become members of the university as 
students and faculty in the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the teach-
ing and service functions were viewed as more appropriate to women since 
they connoted caregiving—the activity that women were involved in the 
private sphere. Women were not associated with the masculine image of 
scholar, passed down from the original monastic figures who preceded the 
modern university. To this day, in American universities teaching and ser-
vice is often associated with the feminine and research with the masculine.86 
As noted above, in the university norms adopted by law schools, research is 
clearly the most salient factor in tenure, promotion, and pay decisions.87 
  
 85. Grendler, supra note 41, at 784-85 (citations omitted). 
 86. See Shelley M. Park, Research, Teaching, and Service: Why Shouldn’t Women’s 
Work Count?, 67 J. HIGHER EDUC. 46, 51 (1996) (“In treating teaching and service as undif-
ferentiated activities, the argument for prioritizing research utilizes a technique commonly 
used to devalue women’s work and, thus, rationalize the unpaid or underpaid status of that 
work. It assumes that there is no difference between good and bad teaching (and service) or, 
that if there is, this difference is unaccounted for by levels of skill, because these are activi-
ties that are instinctual or natural for those who perform them.”). 
 87. See id. at 50 (“Why should research be the primary criterion for tenure and pro-
motion? One line of argument, which focuses on research as an indicator of faculty merit, 
goes something like this: ‘Research separates the men from the boys (or the women from the 
girls). Teaching and service won’t serve this function because everyone teaches and does 
committee work.’ A variation on this theme argues that ‘[t]eaching and service won’t serve 
this function because there is no satisfactory way of evaluating teaching and service.’ Ac-
cording to the first line of reasoning, research performance is the only factor that differenti-
ates faculty presumed to be equal in other respects. According to the second line of reason-
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Academic merit has been based on norms that are historically male, 
with publishing having the dominant role in pay and promotions. There is 
substantial research demonstrating that women publish less than men for a 
number of reasons, including more time with students, family obligations, 
and other external limits on their time.88 
Why do women struggle so hard with the unified model of teaching 
and research and the norms surrounding the emphasis on scholarship as the 
dominant consideration in tenure decisions? Because they work a second 
shift. They work at home as well as the workplace. In addition, they are 
expected to do the caregiving at work as well—putting them in a teaching 
and governance capacity exacerbates these demands. Women who teach are 
expected to caregive for students far more than their male counterparts. And 
women who engage in committee service are burdened with greater expec-
tations and fewer rewards.89 
1. Caregiving at Home 
In her groundbreaking book, The Second Shift, Berkeley sociologist 
Arlie Hochschild offers a detailed study of the cost of the second shift—the 
disproportionate child and home care working women still do—on women, 
men and families.90 She recollects her mother putting Arlie and her brother 
into the family station wagon, with a picnic supper, and driving into Wash-
ington D.C. to pick up her father at his government office on Friday after-
noons.91 She notes that he would come out of the office at 5 p.m. with his 
briefcase and join the family in the car, happy to see them.92 Hochschild 
says, “When I see similar scenes, something inside rips in half. For I am 
neither and both the brisk stepping carrier of a briefcase and the mother with 
  
ing, research performance is the only factor by which faculty members can be objectively 
evaluated, even if they are unequal in other respects.” (footnote omitted)). 
 88. See id. at 47. The author writes: 
Current working assumptions regarding (1) what constitutes good research, teach-
ing, and service and (2) the relative importance of each of these endeavors reflect 
and perpetuate masculine values and practices, thus preventing the professional 
advancement of female faculty both individually and collectively. A gendered divi-
sion of labor exists within (as outside) the contemporary academy wherein research 
is implicitly deemed “men’s work” and is explicitly valued, whereas teaching and 
service are characterized as “women’s work” and explicitly devalued. 
Id.; see also CHARMAINE YOEST, PARENTAL LEAVE IN ACADEMIA 2 (2004), available at 
http://faculty.virginia.edu/familyandtenure/institutional%20report.pdf (noting that even when 
an institution officially attempts to accommodate family obligations, “anecdotal responses 
provide some evidence that stigma is a factor” to parental leave policy use). 
 89. See Park, supra note 86, at 53-54. 
 90. ARLIE RUSSELL HOCHSCHILD WITH ANNE MACHUNG, THE SECOND SHIFT xii (2d 
ed. 2003). 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. 
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the packed picnic supper. The university is still designed for such men and 
their homes for such women.”93 
Hochschild offers empirical support for her assertion that working 
women still perform the most significant proportion of the child care and 
household chores. She notes, “In a 1978 national survey, Joan Huber and 
Glenna Spitze found that 78 percent of husbands think that if husband and 
wife both work full time, they should share housework equally. . . . In fact, 
the husbands of working wives at most average a third of the work at 
home.”94 The results of that study continue to be replicated up to the present 
day.95 
Women also do the disproportionate share of the caregiving of elderly 
relatives. A recent AARP survey demonstrated that women are more likely 
than men to provide care and more likely to provide the most burdensome 
kinds of care.96 
All of this uncompensated carework provides an important subsidy to 
the American economy. Women pick up the disproportionate cost of such 
uncompensated carework. In her book, The Price of Motherhood, Ann Crit-
tenden cites economist Shirley Burggraf who has 
calculated that a husband and wife who earn a combined income of $81,500 per 
year and who are equally capable will lose $1.35 million if they have a child. Most 
of that lost income is the wages forgone by the primary parent. . . . [T]his seems an 
  
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. at 294 n.1 (citing JOAN HUBER & GLENNA SPITZE, SEX STRATIFICATION: 
CHILDREN, HOUSEWORK AND JOBS (1983)). 
 95. See, e.g., Press Release, Bureau of Labor Statistics, American Time Use Sur-
vey—2011 Results (June 22, 2012), available at 
http://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/atus.pdf. The survey by the U.S. Department of Labor 
states that “[o]n an average day, 19 percent of men did housework—such as cleaning or 
doing laundry—compared with 48 percent of women. Forty percent of men did food prepara-
tion or cleanup, compared with 66 percent of women.” Id. at 2. With regard to childcare, 
“[o]n an average day, among adults living in households with children under age 6, women 
spent 1.1 hours providing physical care (such as bathing or feeding a child) to household 
children; by contrast, men spent 26 minutes providing physical care.” Id. at 3; see also Press 
Release, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Married Parents’ Use of Time, 2003–06, at 1 (May 8, 
2008), available at http://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/atus2.pdf (stating that “[m]arried 
mothers employed full time were more likely to do household activities and provide child-
care on an average day than were married fathers employed full time”). 
 96. NAT’L ALLIANCE FOR CAREGIVING & AARP, CAREGIVING IN THE U.S.: 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 2 (2005), available at 
http://assets.aarp.org/rgcenter/il/us_caregiving_1.pdf (“Female caregivers are more likely to 
provide care at the highest Level of Burden (71% at Level 5 and 58% at Level 1). Male care-
givers are more likely to provide care at the lowest Level of Burden (42% at Level 1 and 
29% at Level 5).”). 
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unreasonable penalty on the decision to raise a child, a decision that contributes to 
the general good by adding another productive person to the nation.97  
Burggraf “uses the term ‘feminine economy’ to describe all the work of 
caring for dependents, from infants to the sick and elderly.”98 
2. Caregiving at Work 
Not only do women provide the bulk of caregiving to children and el-
derly, they do the disproportionate share of the “housework” in the work-
place itself, including within the faculty governance structure of the univer-
sity. As noted above, as the university evolved, the idea that faculties should 
self-govern became the norm. However valid that idea may be in terms of 
preserving academic freedom, it has costs for women who attempt full par-
ticipation in the professorial ranks: 
[W]omen in the academy play domestic, supportive roles. Even when hired into 
positions that are equal in name and title to men, women law faculty perform the 
“housework” of the law school. This work includes service on hard-working, low-
status committees in the law schools. 
. . . Internal work seems to be less important to the prestige of the school and, con-
comitantly, to the career of the faculty member. Many men seem to focus more on 
their scholarship and reap the benefits of doing so. Law faculties tend to emulate 
the family’s gender divide. That is, women tend to do the housework—the commit-
tee work and other internal work at the law school—men tend to do the outside 
work—more scholarship, more travel, more self-promotion, more blog entries and 
other “scholarly” career work. 
This problem is not merely a phenomenon of law schools. A recent study at 
the University of California, Irvine found that women do much more of the service 
work at the university and that service work is generally of lower status than re-
search and teaching and is not rewarded by the system. This problem was especial-
ly acute for women who were post-tenure because they were no longer shielded 
from service work.99 
Some scholars have argued that the slow progress of women to ten-
ured, full faculty positions is the result of a choice by women, and individu-
  
 97. ANN CRITTENDEN, THE PRICE OF MOTHERHOOD: WHY THE MOST IMPORTANT JOB 
IN THE WORLD IS STILL THE LEAST VALUED 89 (2001). 
 98. Id. at 275 n.6. 
 99. McGinley, supra note 9, at 150-51 (footnotes omitted) (citing, among other 
sources, Levit, supra note 12, at 777, 786-87 and Kristen Monroe et al., Gender Equality in 
Academia: Bad News from the Trenches, and Some Possible Solutions, 6 PERSP. POL. 215, 
220, 229-30 (2008)). 
Another study of forty professors (twenty men and twenty women) at four major 
research universities found that sixteen of the twenty women (eighty percent of the 
female subjects), as opposed to five of nineteen men (twenty-six percent of the 
males), noted that they had experienced significant increases in institutional service 
responsibilities that detracted from their “scholarly learning.” 
Id. at 151-52. 
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al choice is not something that the university as an institution should have to 
respond to.100 But as we can see from societal structures themselves, women 
who have full time jobs at home and who provide more carework in the 
workplace—when their lives are viewed as a whole—are not really re-
sponding to autonomous choice as much as being squeezed onto a path that 
is the result of this imbalance. While the job description of a professor 
seems gender neutral on its face, when looked at through the narrow lens of 
the workplace it can be seen that it is not neutral in the context of the com-
plete picture of women’s work. 
McGinley challenges the assertion that the disparity in progress is 
simply a matter of individual choice. She notes that women have made up 
almost 50% of law school classes for the past twenty-five years so it is not a 
pipeline problem: 
Some might argue that these stark statistical differences [in the disparity between 
the number of women graduating from American law schools over the past twenty-
five years and the number of women in tenured, full professorships and deanships] 
result from choice or a lack of interest on the part of women lawyers to serve as 
law professors, but in a comprehensive study of women in male-dominated jobs, 
law professor Vicki Schultz demonstrated that women’s “choice” is often shaped 
by the work environment and employment policies. Moreover, Schultz’s empirical 
and qualitative research indicates that women react to opportunities and conditions 
at work in determining the types of work they desire. . . . Unfortunately, Schultz’s 
study demonstrated that workplaces often create barriers to women’s entry and 
success. As Schultz noted, there are “powerful disincentives for women to move 
into and to remain in nontraditional occupations.”101 
McGinley also notes that while “[e]mpirical studies by Merritt, Re-
skin, and Kornhauser, and the statistics collected by the AALS identify im-
portant inequalities that women professors face as employees in law school 
settings,”102 these studies do not identify the structures and norms that create 
such inequalities. For example, these include structures that result in women 
spending more time with students and students reacting poorly to women 
faculty who do not respond to this expectation.103 McGinley does an excel-
lent job identifying the structures and norms that create and perpetuate these 
  
 100. See Laura T. Kessler, Paid Family Leave in American Law Schools: Findings 
and Open Questions, 38 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 661 (2006) (entertaining the possibility that the “opt-
out” theory might account for some of the discrepancy in advancement of female law profes-
sors); see also Stephen J. Ceci & Wendy M. Williams, Understanding Current Causes of 
Women’s Underrepresentation in Science, 108 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 3157 (2011) (con-
cluding that “differential gendered outcomes in the real world result from differences in 
resources attributable to choices, whether free or constrained . . . .”);. 
 101. Id. at 103-04 (footnotes omitted) (quoting Vicki Schultz, Telling Stories About 
Women and Work: Judicial Interpretations of Sex Segregation in the Workplace in Title VII 
Cases Raising the Lack of Interest Argument, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1749, 1816 (1990)). 
 102. Id. at 104. 
 103. See id. at 139-40. 
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inequalities. In the next section, I build on that work and propose some sig-
nificant structural change that I think may be possible at this moment in 
history, given the current crisis in legal education. 
IV. MOVING AWAY FROM THE UNIFIED MODEL AND CHANGING GENDERED 
STRUCTURES 
The cost to women of the unified model of teaching and scholarship is 
clear. Women continue to lag behind in assuming the most powerful posi-
tions in legal academia—tenured full professorships.104 The cost has become 
even more significant with the ratcheting up of the volume of scholarship 
expected of young faculty. To those who say the current structures and ways 
of evaluating faculty for tenure are sacrosanct, I say clearly the university as 
an institution has evolved—as have its forms, structures, and mission—over 
hundreds of years. 
Given the cost of legal education, the nature of the law school as a 
professional and not a graduate school, and the disproportionate cost to 
women, law schools should continue to evolve; law school tenure, which is 
under pressure as a result of the current crisis in legal education, should 
change as well.105 I would argue that innovations introduced by the Hum-
  
 104. A number of reports use the increase in the number of female deans of law 
schools as a metric in measuring women’s progress in legal education. I would argue this 
statistic is of limited value since the dean of the law school is actually not as powerful a 
position in academia as the tenured, full-time professor. For this idea and for the idea of the 
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significant numbers, see id. at 101 n.1. 
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tus, respect, and power. When a woman becomes department chair, the power and 
status seem diminished, and the service dimension becomes stressed.” 
Id. at 151 (alteration in original) (quoting Monroe et al., supra note 99, at 219-20). 
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REUTERS NEWS & INSIGHT (Nov. 16, 2011), http://newsandinsight.thomsonreuters. 
com/Legal/News/2011/11_-_November/ABA_committee_considers_dropping_tenure-
policy_requirement. For the actual standards, see AM. BAR ASS’N, 2007–2008 ABA 
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sWebContent/Chapter_4.authcheckdam.pdf. For commentary, see Paul L. Caron, ABA Mi-
nority Proposal Softens Removal of Tenure as Accreditation Standard, TAXPROF BLOG (Mar. 
22, 2011), http://taxprof.typepad.com/taxprof_blog/2011/03/aba-softens-.html; Paul L. Ca-
ron, ABA Continues to Consider Removal of Tenure as Accreditation Standard, TAXPROF 
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boldtian model of the modern university, to the degree that they emphasized 
the integration of teaching and original research, have had an adverse im-
pact on women faculty. A corollary development, the de facto emphasis on 
scholarship to the exclusion of teaching and service in the tenure process, 
has also been a structural barrier for women in the university. To the degree 
that American law schools adopted these models when they became parts of 
the larger university, these models had a depressing effect on the progress of 
women into tenured, full professorships. 
There is no question that the Humboldtian legacy of the unified model 
has benefits and that there are synergies created when faculty engage in 
teaching and scholarship at the same time. However, there are also costs 
both to legal education generally and to women faculty in particular that 
must be balanced against the fact that there are significant benefits to the 
model as well. This cost-benefit analysis may also play out differently in the 
context of the American law school that grants the J.D., a professional de-
gree, as opposed to other departments of the university, where the degree 
granted is the Ph.D., a terminal research degree. Unlike their colleagues in 
Political Science, Economics, or Philosophy who are explicitly training fu-
ture scholars who will receive a Ph.D., law faculty are preparing practition-
ers who will receive a J.D. New information in a law professor’s field may 
arguably be gained more appropriately by reading broadly rather than by 
engaging in time-consuming original research and scholarship.106 The argu-
ment for this position is outlined below. 
The idea that students with debt-financed tuition dollars are cross-
subsidizing legal scholarship by faculty has been a central part of the recent 
debate on the crisis in American legal education. A Ph.D. candidate in an 
American graduate school not only typically has her tuition waived, she is 
paid by the university through teaching fellowships and stipends. Ph.D. 
candidates work for the university as graduate assistants teaching small sec-
tions of lectures. This is very different from the financing model for legal 
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 106. See Scordato, supra note 15, at 369 (“The majority of empirical studies . . . have 
found no significant relationship between teaching effectiveness and research productivity . . 
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scholarship where the cross-subsidy arises from tuition dollars paid by law 
students and financed by debt. 
In addition, law students must attend one of only two hundred ABA 
approved law schools in order to be eligible to sit for the bar exam in the 
vast majority of states.107 Graduate students in Philosophy, Political Science, 
or Economics, on the other hand, may choose among the graduate school 
that offers them the most prestige and/or competitive financial deal without 
regard to the oligopolistic practices of American law schools that hold the 
franchise—ABA accreditation—that diminishes competition. One can be a 
political scientist, a philosopher, or an economist without additional creden-
tialing. One cannot practice law without a license, and one may not get a 
license without taking a state bar exam. And one can only take a state bar 
exam if one has graduated from an ABA accredited school. Thus, scholar-
ship and research among faculty in American universities is not paid for by 
graduate students—the universities pay them. This is the polar opposite of 
American law schools where law students pay debt-funded tuition that in 
turn cross-subsidizes legal scholarship by law faculty. 
So there are myriad reasons to reconsider the model of American legal 
education and, in particular, the unified model of teaching and scholarship 
adopted from university norms. Wholesale change could take two paths: we 
could abandon the unified model and offer a dedicated teaching or a dedi-
cated scholarship track; or we could adopt a model of research institute that 
would provide an “incubator” for women scholars who are primary caregiv-
ers. In either case, women would be provided the time and space to become 
scholars in their own right. 
A. The Dedicated Track Model 
Some scholars have suggested that law schools move to a dedicated 
track model.108 Law faculty would be free to choose either an exclusively 
teaching track or an exclusively scholarship track. 
1. Benefits of a Dedicated Track Model 
The benefits of a dedicated track model include allowing professors to 
focus their energy on improved and innovative pedagogy if they choose the 
teaching track or to focus on excellence in scholarship if they choose the 
research track.109 This clearly offers benefits for legal education as a whole 
since it improves the experience of the students, and it isolates legal schol-
  
 107. See ABA-Approved Law Schools, A.B.A., http://www.americanbar.org/groups/ 
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 108. See Scordato, supra note 15, at 410-14. 
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arship which may be better subsidized by privately donated dollars and state 
or federal research grants rather than student tuition dollars. 
It also offers significant benefits for women faculty who are primary 
caregivers of children and elderly relatives. By creating an exclusively 
scholarship track, women could opt onto that track until tenure. They would 
have the time to focus on scholarship, which is the dominant factor in tenure 
and promotion decisions, in a way that their second shift both at home and 
at work does not currently allow. 
By opting for a dedicated scholarship track, women would be able to 
avoid the disproportionate burden that attaches to the teaching function for 
women in terms of student expectations. These expectations include how 
available women faculty should be for advice, writing clerkship recommen-
dation letters, and other byproducts of teaching a large first-year or upper 
division required course. 
When they have secured tenure, women could choose to be on a teach-
ing track for the post-tenure period. At this point, they would have estab-
lished themselves as scholars and could more easily accommodate the in-
creased burdens of teaching that attach to their gender. For example, even 
when teaching is given some weight in assessing compensation, the use of 
student evaluations has serious flaws, as noted in a wide body of literature 
on gender bias in student evaluations.110 Utilizing such evaluations can have 
negative effects on compensation in direct and indirect ways, including time 
taken from scholarship by the need for women to work harder than men to 
receive comparable student evaluations.111 And men often receive the insti-
tutional teaching awards.112 
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For the dedicated model to be successful, law schools might have to 
offer incentives for faculty to opt into the teaching track. These could in-
clude higher pay or chaired professorships. This would help offset the per-
ceived cost in terms of prestige that many faculty would see in opting for a 
dedicated teaching track. 
Law schools could also give a preference to faculty members who are 
the primary caretaker for children or elderly relatives in their families when 
selecting those faculty members who could opt for the dedicated scholarship 
track. Higher education institutions currently have criteria to determine who 
is a primary caretaker in terms of parental leave.113 Similar criteria could be 
used to select faculty who are allowed to opt for the dedicated scholarship 
track. While this would likely result in more women being allowed onto that 
track, the criteria would be facially gender neutral. 
There is substantial evidence that women do a disproportionate share 
of the institutional housework in academia generally.114 They “caregive” and 
tend to students more than their male colleagues.115 There is also a clearly 
gendered pattern of course assignments in law schools with women being 
assigned to less prestigious areas of the curriculum.116 Young professors 
tend to write in the areas they have been assigned to teach, if simply to be 
efficient in the learning of their subjects. If women are not channeled into 
less prestigious areas of the curriculum because they are not teaching early 
in their careers, they may write in areas that are more likely to be published 
in highly ranked law reviews. There is a nexus between the rank of the jour-
nals in which a faculty member publishes and the perception of her “market 
value.” There is clear evidence that women are published less frequently in 
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American law reviews than men.117 These are all examples of norms that are 
skewed against women in terms of how their institutions value them. A ded-
icated track model may help alleviate many of the costs imposed on women 
faculty by such skewed norms. 
Most American law schools do not have a mandatory paid maternity 
leave policy. This puts young, untenured women at a significant disad-
vantage in the race to tenure. There is anecdotal evidence that men use pa-
ternity leave to write while women use maternity leave to caregive, which 
raises policy concerns. Ad hoc leave policies which require negotiation by 
untenured faculty are disadvantageous to women who are clearly less likely 
to “ask” and negotiate for themselves in terms of pay and benefits, accord-
ing to a number of studies.118 A dedicated track would also allow women to 
write and to become mothers in their prime childbearing years. Thus, a ded-
icated track model would structurally resolve many of the issues currently 
addressed in the context of discussions about whether and how to offer paid 
maternity leave. 
2. Costs of a Dedicated Track Model 
Some might argue that abandoning the unified model of teaching and 
scholarship imposes costs on law students in terms of faculty who are less 
up to date in their fields. They might argue that women faculty received 
positive reinforcement from students and would lose that support if they opt 
for a scholarship track. In addition, the financial cost of a dedicated track is 
significant. Tuition dollars subsidize research and writing. To disaggregate 
teaching and scholarship would arguably require new ways of financing 
legal scholarship which, in turn, may answer some of the criticism currently 
being leveled at legal education. 
There is also a cost to the institution in terms of not being able to 
evaluate teaching effectiveness pre-tenure. However, in reality tenure com-
mittees give little weight to teaching and service and the quality and quanti-
ty of a tenure candidate’s scholarship is the dominant factor in tenure deci-
sions at American law schools. Candidates are rarely denied tenure because 
they are not competent in the classroom and are much more likely to be 
denied tenure if they fail to produce sufficient scholarship. 
I would argue that each of these costs identified above is offset by the 
value of creating a level playing field for women scholars to get a foothold 
  
 117. See, e.g., Minna J. Kotkin, Of Authorship and Audacity: An Empirical Study of 
Gender Disparity and Privilege in the “Top Ten” Law Reviews, 31 WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 
385, 386 (2010) (concluding that there is “significant gender disparity in publication [in the 
fifteen ‘top ten’ law reviews] with some variation as to degree”). 
 118. See generally LINDA BABCOCK & SARA LASCHEVER, WOMEN DON’T ASK: 
NEGOTIATION AND THE GENDER DIVIDE (2003). 
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in their field and develop an expertise. The uphill battle for women to be 
perceived as scholars, given the roots of the university itself, is significant. 
Women provide a disproportionate service to society in terms of care-
giving. Both women who have children and women who do not have chil-
dren provide care to children and elderly relatives in higher numbers than 
men who are similarly situated.119 Such caregiving must be valued by every 
institution in civil society. To do so in American law schools would teach 
students that caregiving is an important social value. And men who could 
demonstrate primary caregiving of children or elderly relatives might be 
incentivized to do so in order to be eligible for a dedicated scholarship 
track. If affirmative action is justified in hiring as a method of remedying 
past discrimination, then it should be justified in creating a separate track 
for primary caregivers, who will admittedly be predominantly women. Such 
a track provides them the time to develop as scholars which is essential in 
solving the seniority gap since scholarship is the primary criteria for moving 
up the ranks to tenured, full professor positions. 
Finally, a dedicated model would not automatically relieve a faculty 
member of the service required by norms of faculty governance. Women 
pick up a disproportionate share of the “housework” portion of such gov-
ernance work, as demonstrated above. But presumably a dean could allow 
faculty on a dedicated scholarship track to opt out of committee work as a 
means of reducing the disproportionate burden. 
B. The Research Institute Model 
In the early years of the Humboldtian model, individual faculty had 
their own research institutes.120 These institutes were later abandoned due to 
institutional constraints, politics, and the need for large university wide sub-
sidies, but they did exist at the beginning of the Humboldtian movement: 
“Each full professor at the University of Berlin directed an ‘institute’ or 
‘seminar’ (curricular specialization) built around himself and including a 
pyramid of junior professors, lecturers, and students. Full professors also 
negotiated directly with the appropriate government ministries, not the uni-
versity, for the funding of their institutes.”121 
The separate research institute may be an alternative to the dedicated 
track model that provides women time and space to become experienced 
scholars within the American university. The creation of legal research in-
stitutes within universities, where women scholars could opt to work on 
research questions and publish as a career track, would provide a place for 
women to be free of the increased burdens women face as a result of faculty 
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governance and teaching work. These institutes could be supported by pri-
vate donor dollars or by state support in public universities. Or one could 
argue that if the research is valuable, the free market will support it. These 
solutions would answer the criticism of the current model where student 
tuition dollars financed by debt provide non-transparent cross-subsidies of 
faculty scholarship. 
These research institutes would provide “incubators” where women 
could establish themselves as scholars without the disparate impact that the 
teaching and governance imposes on women. Women could establish them-
selves as scholars during their prime childbearing years. The latter is an 
important social function that should be accommodated by the university. 
Given the valorization of pure research over teaching for purposes of tenure, 
chairs, leaves, etc., and prestige as measured by the law school rankings in 
U.S. News and World Report, such a model would allow women to opt to be 
pure researchers and avoid the disparate cost of teaching and governance 
imposed on women faculty. Unlike the dedicated track model, the research 
institute model would have the benefit of minimizing the burdens of both 
functions on women faculty. 
As noted above, one might also argue that interdisciplinary legal re-
search that tends to be more theoretical should be housed in the political 
science, philosophy, or economics departments of the universities that house 
law schools. Faculty in these departments tend to earn significantly less than 
law professors. If law students would like a career in legal scholarship, they 
would have to opt for obtaining both a J.D. and a Ph.D.—the research de-
gree—and would join the faculties in these other departments. This model 
of producing legal scholarship is arguably less expensive when viewed from 
a meta-university level perspective since the faculty salaries are significant-
ly lower. If one were to establish legal research institutes, faculty from both 
the law school and these other departments would have a space to collabo-
rate. The research would also not be subsidized by debt-funded law student 
tuition dollars; rather, graduate students in those departments would be paid 
by the university while obtaining their Ph.D. The subsidy could come from 
research grants from governmental institutions like the National Science 
Foundation or the National Institutes of Health. Resituating interdisciplinary 
legal scholarship in such legal research institutes that draw on other depart-
ments of the university would allow such “law and” scholarship to flourish. 
It provides a place for scholarly production, with insights from both law and 
the other disciplines, while moving the funding mechanism for such schol-
arship away from debt-financed law student tuition dollars, a criticism of 
the status quo, which has been a significant part of the discourse about the 
current crisis in legal education. For example, some would argue that econ-
omists are not equipped by themselves to produce accurate law and eco-
nomics scholarship because they are not schooled in the legal system. By 
resituating this kind of hybrid scholarship in legal research institutes that 
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include legal scholars and scholars from other departments, the quality of 
such research could be improved. Faculty who opted to work within such 
institutes could acquire both a J.D. and a Ph.D. They would thus be 
equipped with an actual research degree, be well-versed in statistical meth-
ods and be better able to do sound empirical research. This move would 
acknowledge the reality that the J.D. is a professional degree that is not 
meant to train students to be scholars but rather to be practicing lawyers and 
judges.122 
This decoupling of abstract research from law teaching would argua-
bly put the “professional” back in professional school and would alleviate 
some of the distortions that have been the subject of much external media 
scrutiny of legal education in the current crisis. This, in turn, would benefit 
students who have to go into significant debt to obtain a professional—not a 
graduate—degree so they can actually practice law. 
C. The Argument for Moving Away from the Status Quo to Either Model 
I would argue that moving away from the unified model of teaching 
and research in the American law school to either a dedicated track model 
or a separate research institute model would facilitate the development of a 
generation of women scholars. It would eliminate the unequal burden on 
time and energy that women experience by the reproducing of gender that 
McGinley identifies in her work.123 It would minimize the costs to students 
of the unified model that the current crisis in legal education has empha-
sized, including the lack of time or incentives for innovative pedagogy.124 
As Hochschild notes: 
The career woman pays a cost by entering a clockwork of careers that permits little 
time or emotional energy to raise a family. Her career permits so little of these be-
cause it was originally designed to suit a traditional man whose wife raised his 
children. In this arrangement between career and family, the family was the wel-
fare agency for the university and women were its social workers. Now women are 
working in such institutions without benefit of the social worker.125 
Some might decry the result of such structural change that would re-
sult in men doing more of the teaching and governance in American law 
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schools. I would argue that this potential cost to men is worthwhile in terms 
of social investment in the scholarship of women. Under either a dedicated 
track or research institute model that gave a preference to primary caregiv-
ers, the university would absorb the cost of caregiving rather than allocating 
the cost to the individual. In a public law school, in particular, this would 
signal to law students that the state values caregiving. If men become prima-
ry caregivers of children or elderly relatives, then they too could be given 
preference for the dedicated scholarship track. Currently, women who are 
primary caregivers are challenged by a lack of time to produce the same 
quantity and quality of scholarship that their male counterparts produce. 
Women raise new citizens as well as perform paid work. Either of these 
new models would acknowledge that carework and compensate primary 
caregivers for it with time. 
There are federal government programs, like the National Science 
Foundation’s ADVANCE program,126 that fund research to support women 
scholars in the STEM fields. This program could be adapted to fund an ex-
periment in the disaggregation of the unified model at a small group of 
American law schools. ADVANCE has highly developed metrics to meas-
ure whether efforts funded by the NSF grants are effective.127 These metrics 
could be adapted to legal academia as a way to measure the effectiveness of 
such new models. They could be used to evaluate whether such models fa-
cilitate faster progress for women into tenured, full professorships. 
American law schools could also explore part-time tenured positions. 
However, this approach would not resolve the disproportionate costs im-
posed on women by the teaching and governance functions, although it does 
have the benefit of being more politically likely to come to fruition. While 
we must pursue individual remedies, we also have to be bold in pursuing 
more collective, structural remedies as well. Universities and the law 
schools within them, especially public ones, must acknowledge that women 
as a group are far more likely to be primary caregivers. They must redefine 
the job description of tenure-track and tenured law professor to reflect that 
reality. The institution rather than the individual should bear a larger share 
of the cost of the benefit that women’s caregiving provides to society as a 
whole. 
The playing field for women scholars is not level, and while the job 
description that attaches to tenure track positions at American law schools 
appears neutral on its face, it in fact has a disproportionate impact on wom-
en. Facially neutral university norms about the unified model of teaching 
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and scholarship have a disparate impact. We have used affirmative action in 
the past in hiring to remedy this imbalance and that has not proven suffi-
cient to yield equal numbers of men and women in tenured full professor-
ships. My proposals go beyond hiring and provide an institutional subsidy 
in recognition of the time women currently spend in caregiving at home and 
for students and the law school itself. These proposals may be in tension 
with principles of neutrality and fairness of opportunity rather than out-
comes, but the neutrality principle in this regard is flawed when it comes to 
the structure of law schools and universities. This is particularly true when 
the production of scholarship has become the only important criteria for 
tenured positions. I have seen more than one situation where a male and a 
female candidate come up for tenure and the woman has far fewer articles 
than the male candidate. And the only reason for the disparity is that the 
female candidate has the primary responsibility at home for children while 
the male candidate has a spouse at home who does the primary caregiving 
of his children. However, the disparity is often construed as the female can-
didate being less qualified or less committed to the scholarly enterprise. 
The structures of the American university itself are gendered at their 
very core. And, while they appear neutral, they have a disparate impact on 
women. Thus, the fundamental structures must be altered long enough to 
develop critical mass of female scholars. Such changes might be analogized 
to the legislative quotas imposed by a number of other countries in order to 
achieve gender parity. Indeed, some countries like Denmark decided that 
they could repeal such measures when the numbers of men and women in 
elective office became more balanced.128 Similarly, the structural changes I 
propose may only be necessary until society as a whole reallocates both 
private and institutional caregiving and housekeeping more fairly. 
CONCLUSION 
Universities reproduce cultural norms in societies and women are 
marginalized in these institutions as much as they are in other institutions of 
civil society. Individual solutions like paid maternity leave, and more atten-
tion to who does the institutional housework are not going to be sufficient to 
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disrupt the reproduction of gender in universities and their law schools. As 
long as scholarship is the coin of the realm and women work two full-time 
jobs at home and at work, they will continue to earn less both in terms of 
monetary compensation and respect as scholars, “‘even when they hold the 
same rank as men.’”129 
Ann McGinley and others have correctly identified the norms that 
caused the power imbalance in American legal education, including implicit 
bias, lack of institutional help with work/family conflicts, and masculine 
norms that cause the reproduction of gender.130 It will take vision and cour-
age for American law schools to restructure in fundamental ways that 
acknowledge that imbalance and that offer institutional support for women 
who are primary caretakers of children or elderly relatives.131 
Our chances of achieving such change have never been better. With 
the advent of the employment crisis and the external drumbeat of the na-
tional media, we have momentum, and the spotlight has been directed on 
our corner of the academic world. This widespread, national criticism about 
the structure of law schools should help us increase the pace of change. 
Long-held beliefs about how law schools should be structured are coming 
under increasing pressure. We should use the crisis as a springboard for 
fundamental change that promises full equality for future generations of 
women in academia. As Bill Henderson has said, “For over a century, law 
schools have suffered from an inferiority complex. We have masked it well, 
but its consequences are finally coming home to roost. Like most psycho-
logical conditions, our lives will be much better and healthier when we deal 
with its root cause.”132 The same could be said for dealing with the root 
causes of the slow progress in women faculty ascending to tenured, full 
professorships in the legal academy. 
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